

USAREUR Soldier Study II: Kosovo Mid-Deployment

Pre-Brief

Prepared by the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe



Purpose of Brief

To present findings from the mid-deployment Kosovo Soldier Study of 1st Infantry Division soldiers, which was conducted on-site in Kosovo.

Background

- An assessment of 1st ID soldiers was completed in March/April 1999 before these soldiers deployed to Kosovo.
- This longitudinal research assessment was initiated at the request of GEN Meigs, CG, USAREUR/7A on 2 MAR 99.
- The DCSPER, USAREUR/7A is the lead agency for the study.
- The U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe (USAMRU-E), located in Heidelberg, Germany, designed and executed the study.



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Summary of Findings (1 of 2)

- The deployment and training tempo of the 1st ID soldiers in Kosovo is high.
- The workload of the soldiers is high, with soldiers working nearly every day of the week for nearly 13 hours per day.
- Soldiers' attitudes about military deployments were much more negative while deployed to Kosovo than before they deployed.
- Soldiers reported that the deployment made their work much more interesting.
- The Kosovo deployment has increased family strain.
- Soldiers deployed to Kosovo experienced a great number of potentially traumatic events, nearly four times that of soldiers deployed to Bosnia (OJE).
- The rate of reported personal accidents were lower in Kosovo than in Bosnia (OJE).
- Soldiers who experienced violent or traumatic events had higher rates of depression, slept less, and were under strain.



Summary of Findings (2 of 2)

- Soldiers' attitudes about peacekeeping missions became more negative as a result of the Kosovo deployment.
- Soldiers deployed to Kosovo viewed their units operational readiness as high.
- Confidence in leadership declined during the deployment, although soldiers' view of leadership was still higher than the CONUS (norm) average.
- The deployment to Kosovo did not change the percentage of soldiers who intended to make the Army a career, although the percentage of soldiers who are undecided about an Army career doubled.
- Compared to soldiers in garrison (Europe), soldiers deployed to Kosovo are healthy, and they report fewer physical health symptoms than soldiers in garrison.
- Living conditions, M-W-R activities, religious activities, news/information about world events and AAFES were evaluated positively.
- Mail services, food, telephone services, continuing education opportunities, and media coverage of the mission were viewed less positively by soldiers.



OPTEMPO Performance Models: STP G

- The U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command established a specific Science and Technology Program (STP G) beginning in FY00 to address the issue of OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO and readiness.
- This program will consist of four separate, but integrated, components:
- 1. OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO Study (Soldiers and Units)
 - 10 Company, two-year longitudinal study
 - Time 1 data collection completed
 - Time 2 data collection began in OCT 99
 - Kosovo Soldier Study
 - Pre-deployment (MAR/APR 99)
 - Mid-deployment (OCT 99)
 - Post deployment (planned for JAN 00)
- 2. Senior Leader Study (in progress)
- 3. War Planners Staff Study (under development)
- **4. Family OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO Study** (under development)



Study Execution and Comparison Studies

- A Human Dimensions Research Team from Heidelberg, Germany, collected data on-site at Camp Able Sentry, Camp Bondsteel, Camp Monteith, and remote sites from 4-7 OCT 99.
- The mid-deployment assessment examined mission, organizational, physical, and psychological health indicators. Both survey and interview data were collected.
- Total Number of Kosovo Mid-Deployment Surveys Completed: 1,718
- Number of soldier and leader interviews conducted: 15
- Comparison Data sets: In this report, results of the Kosovo mid-deployment assessment are compared to the results of other studies conducted by the USAMRU-E.
- Kosovo Pre-Deployment Soldier Study -MAR/APR 1999 (N = 2,094)
- Bosnia Mid-Deployment Study (Operation Joint Endeavor) JUN 1996 (N = 1,038)
- USAREUR OPTEMPO Study (Garrison Phase) JUN-AUG 1999 (N = 768)
- CONUS Study JAN 1997 (N= 2,731)
- Soldier Burnout Study JUL 1997 (N = 2,256)



Units Assessed

- Units from the 1st ID were assessed before (pre-) and during (mid-) the Kosovo deployment. Every attempt was made to assess as many of the units during both time periods.
- Soldiers from the following units were included in each assessment:

Pre-Deployment

Mid-Deployment

TF 1-26	
TF 1-77	
1-7 FA	
2-1 AVN	
9 ENG	
101 MI	
4-3 ADA	
121 SIG	
TF 1-18*	
1-6 FA*	
82 ENG*	


HQ, TF Falcon
TF 1-26
TF 1-77
TF 2-1 AVN
9th ENG
101 MI
TF 299
121 SIG
TF 1-7 FA
DISCOM
4-3 ADA


^{*}These units did not deploy to Kosovo and are not part of the mid-deployment assessment.



Deployment Tempo (1 of 2)


OPTEMPO EQUATION:





p < 0.001

- Although there were no rank differences in deployment load during predeployment, there were rank differences in deployment load during middeployment.
- Junior enlisted personnel had higher deployment load rates than other personnel [F(3, 1606)=3.13, p<.001].




Rank (Kosovo Mid-Deployment)

E1-E4 53.0% E5-E6 29.1% E7-E9 5.4% Officers 12.5%



Deployment Tempo (2 of 2)

- The deployment load index for soldiers deployed to Kosovo were the highest ever recorded. For all ranks, junior enlisted, NCOs, and officers, the deployment load was extremely high.
- The previous record for the highest deployment load was also held by soldiers from the 1st ID (Burnout Study), who deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Guard (OJG).







Workload and Sleep

- Workload was based on the number of days and hours that soldiers and leaders reported working, while in garrison and while deployed to Kosovo.
- Soldiers deployed to Kosovo reported working longer hours [t(353)=17.73, p<.001] and more days per week [(t(344)=10.79,p<.001] compared to when they were in garrison (i.e., pre-deployment).
- Although workload has increased, the number of hours of sleep has not significantly changed.

In the past week, how many days have you performed duty related work?*



In the past week, what is the average number of hours per day of:




*p<.001, N=344 (matched data set pre- and mid-deployment)



Soldier Attitudes: Military Deployments


Number of Deployments

- Soldiers reported that 1 to 2 deployments within a three-year period is ideal.
- Soldiers had a lower ideal number of deployments when they responded during deployment than prior to deployment [t(357)=9.98, p<.001].



Deployment Length

- Soldiers reported that a deployment should last about 5 months.
- Soldiers reported similar ideal deployment lengths regardless of whether they responded during deployment or prior to deployment.



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Average time deployed in Kosovo at the time of assessment was 3.3 months.

*p<.001, N=361




Soldier Attitudes: Military Deployments (1 of 2)

• Soldiers' attitudes about military deployments were much more negative while they were deployed to Kosovo (mid-deployment) than before they deployed (pre-deployment) [all ps<.01].

• However, soldiers did find their work more interesting as a result of being

deployed [p<.01].






Soldier Attitudes: Military Deployments (2 of 2)

• More soldiers reported during the mid-deployment assessment that the number of deployments hurt the stability of their marriage and placed a big strain on their family [all ps<.01].

• More soldiers also reported during the mid-deployment assessment that they planned to leave the military because of there are too many

deployments [p < .01].

Marital Status of Samples		
	Pre	Mid
Single	41.4%	39.2%
Married	51.7%	52.8%
Separated	2.8%	2.7%
Divorced	4.1%	5.2%




^{*}The responses only apply to married personnel.



Traumatic Experiences: Kosovo vs. Bosnia


- Soldiers deployed to Kosovo reported being exposed to traumatic or violent events at a much higher rate than soldiers deployed to Bosnia as part of OJE.
- Soldiers in Kosovo also reported lower injury rates due to accidents compared to those soldiers deployed to Bosnia.





Traumatic Experiences and Depression

- Soldiers deployed to Kosovo who reported exposure to violent or traumatic events had higher rates of depression [p<.001].
- Soldiers who saw dead or injured civilians were more likely to report that they lost sleep, were constantly under strain, and were depressed [ps<.001].
- There were no significant differences in depression rates for soldiers who had aided in the removal of unexploded ordnance [t(1689)=1.33, p=.184] or the removal of human remains [t(1691)=1.37, p=.173].





Well-Being in Kosovo


MORALE

- 71.1% of soldiers reported good morale (medium to very high).
- Although morale is high, soldiers are feeling the impact of the deployment.

BURNOUT

• 73.8% of soldiers reported that they were either burned out (high or very high) or beginning to feel burned out (medium).


- Soldiers deployed on the Kosovo mission had similar depression scores as those soldiers in the OPTEMPO Garrison study [t(2486)=0.982, p=.326].
- Both the soldiers in Garrison and those deployed to Kosovo report lower depression scores than did those soldiers deployed to Bosnia (OJE).





Soldier Attitudes: Peacekeeping


- At mid-deployment, more soldiers expressed a negative view of peacekeeping missions when compared to the pre-deployment sample [all ps<.01].
- Relative to peacekeeping attitudes during OJE mid-deployment, Kosovo mid-deployment ratings were slightly more positive.





Soldier Attitudes: Military Readiness


- Soldiers deployed to Kosovo reported that their unit's operational readiness was higher than before they deployed [1(7,780)=3.98, p<.001].
- For example, more soldiers deployed to Kosovo reported that their company was ready for combat $[X^2(1,N=3,768)=7,84, p < .01]$ and that they had confidence in their unit's mission essential equipment $[X^2(1,N=3,774)=17.0, p,.001]$ compared to before they deployed.





Soldier Attitudes: Unit Leadership (1 of 2)

- Unit leadership was assessed by asking soldiers about the quality of leadership in the unit, how well the leaders would perform in combat, and how well the chain-of-command functions.
- Soldiers were less confident in their unit's leadership at the Kosovo middeployment assessment than at the pre-deployment assessment [t(3,744)=4.53, p<.001].
- However, both the Kosovo pre- and mid-deployment assessments of leadership were higher than the CONUS norm.






Soldier Attitudes: Unit Leadership (2 of 2)

	Rank	
	Pre	Mid
E1-E4	64.8%	53.0%
NCOs	28.5%	34.5%
Officers	6.7%	12.5%


- The general decline in soldier's attitude regarding unit leadership was due to junior enlisted, NCOs, and officers **all** viewing unit leadership less favorably.
- Soldiers of higher rank viewed unit leadership higher.





Soldier Career Intentions


- The rate of soldiers who intend to make the Army a career did not change significantly from pre- to mid-deployment. During pre-deployment, 34.7% of the soldiers reported that they would definitely or probably stay in the military until retirement vs. 33.4% of the soldiers during mid-deployment.
- However, at mid-deployment, more soldiers were undecided about their career intentions than at pre-deployment $[X^2(3,N=3,525)=81.34, p<.001]$.





Physical Symptoms

- Soldiers deployed to Kosovo reported fewer physical symptoms than those soldiers in garrison (Europe). Soldiers in Kosovo reported an average of 2.1 physical symptoms compared to 2.5 symptoms for soldiers in garrison (Europe) [t(2,484=2.9, p<.01)].
- Soldiers deployed to Kosovo did report more stomach/intestinal upset, and diarrhea, and less weight loss/gain than soldiers in Garrison [ps < .05].





Quality of Life Rating Scale

- Soldiers' perspective of the quality of life (or services) during the Kosovo deployment was assessed using a 10-item scale.
- Soldiers' perspectives were converted to a green, amber, or red rating.
- The following conversion was adopted:
 - A green rating was given if only 0-19% of the soldiers rated the service as bad or very bad.

Excellent Service or Support

An amber rating was given if 20-24% of the soldiers rated the service as bad or very bad.

Service or Support Area May Need Improvement

A red rating was given if 25% or more of the soldiers rated the service as bad or very bad.


Service or Support Needs Improvement

• The red rating was based on the simple notion that if one-fourth (25%) or more of soldiers report that a service is bad, then efforts should be directed to improve it.



Quality of Life During Deployment


- Over three-quarters (77.8%) of soldiers reported that the quality of life in their unit was good (medium to very high).
- More specifically, five of the ten services received green ratings, two services received amber ratings, and three received red ratings.





Soldier Concerns

• Soldiers' top concerns or stressors are similar to those expressed by soldiers on other peacekeeping missions (e.g, Operation Joint Endeavor).





Soldier and Leader Interviews (1 of 2)

The USAMRU-E Research Team conducted on-site interviews and observations with 1st ID soldiers. Soldiers interviewed were in units with security and patrol missions in local communities. Interviews consisted of separate group interviews with junior enlisted and NCOs, as well as company leader interviews.

During the interviews, soldiers raised the following points:

- Leadership. Overall, soldiers have a very positive view of their leadership at the company level, both NCO and officer. Soldiers would prefer to have less turnover among unit officers during peacekeeping missions.
- **K+90**. Soldiers have a negative view of the outcome of the K+90 negotiations with the UCK. Soldiers expressed the view that an armed Albanian force makes the peacekeeping environment in Kosovo more dangerous.
- **Pass Policy**. Soldiers would like a pass policy that allows them to visit local communities during their off-duty hours. They noted different standards among KFOR forces, and within the U.S. Army, in regard to alcohol use and off-duty freedoms.



Soldier and Leader Interviews (2 of 2)

- Mail. Soldiers noted that mail service has been slow, as that late mail has resulted in financial difficulties for some soldiers.
- **Prospects for Mission Success.** Soldiers noted extreme hostility remaining between Albanian and Serb ethnic groups in Kosovo, and expressed doubt that these groups would be able to live together in peace without KFOR presence.
- **Relations with Local Population.** Soldiers characterized relations with local ethnic groups as generally positive. In units where interviews were conducted, U.S. soldiers have established effective rapport with local civilians.
- **Time with Family**. Due to training exercises and the current deployment, soldiers interviewed have spent little time with the families since late last year.
- Equipment Readiness. Soldiers reported that it is difficult to obtain parts for heavy equipment.



Conclusions and Recommendations (1 of 3)

- Overall, the Kosovo force looks pretty good. There are, however, indicators and areas of concern.
- The deployment tempo and workload of these 1st ID soldiers are extremely high, and this high tempo is having an adverse impact on soldiers' career intentions and on their families. **Recommendation:** Upon returning to garrison (Europe) these units should be given a 2-3 month break from major training exercises and at least a 6 month break from future deployments.
- The physical and psychological health of the soldiers is relatively good. However, soldiers are experiencing numerous violent and/or traumatic events that can affect their future mental health.
 - **Recommendation:** Approximately one month after returning home, conduct a Task Forcewide mental health assessment similar to the one conducted by the 1st AD after they returned from Kosovo. Include a mental health screen, education, and follow up. Encourage spouse involvement and participation.
- Although soldier ratings of leadership have decreased since deploying to Kosovo, they are still relatively high. In addition, soldier morale is high and soldiers truly believe that they are contributing to the success of the mission.
 - **Recommendation:** Don't be overly concerned about the decline in soldiers' perceptions of leadership; a similar pattern was also observed for the Bosnia deployment, with leadership perceptions increasing once soldiers returned to home station. Do ensure that soldiers are properly recognized and rewarded for their contributions to the mission.



Conclusions and Recommendations (2 of 3)

- Soldiers are not convinced that the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo will ultimately succeed.
 Many soldiers view the K+90 as a failure and feel betrayed by the senior leadership (both military and political) because the K+90 agreement was not enforced.
 Recommendation: Tell the soldiers what the U.S.'s long-term strategy is in Kosovo. Let them know how they are contributing to the mission's long-range success. Involve as many
- Mail services are a problem for some soldiers. These soldiers report that they either don't receive packages at all or that there are long delays in delivery. Some soldiers even report receiving damaged (i.e, "crushed") packages.
 Recommendation: A bottom-up review of the mail system might be in order. Involve the soldiers themselves in this review if possible.
- Telephone services are also a problem for many soldiers, especially at the remote sites where telephone access is difficult. Contacting family members who don't live near an Army installation is also difficult. (There appears to be problems associated with using Air Force and Navy installation telephone operators.)
 - **Recommendation:** Establish a program that will allow soldiers to contact, free-of-charge, immediate family members who don't live near an Army installation.

senior leaders and officials as possible.



Conclusions and Recommendations (3 of 3)

- Soldiers are very interested in continuing education opportunities. They are especially concerned about this issue during deployments as they feel they are falling behind their peers in civilian and military education.
 - **Recommendation:** Let soldiers know what opportunities are available to them now, and what opportunities will be available for them in the future.
- The policy on passes and leave is unclear or unpopular. Soldiers would like passes reinstated in order to visit local shops and restaurants. Soldiers are concerned that there is no clear policy regarding leave. This is especially important to soldiers deployed for longer than 6 months.

Recommendation: Publish a clear pass and leave policy. Ensure that soldiers know what the policy is.



Backup Slides



Military Readiness: Scale Items

Military Identity - adapted from the Military Self-Esteem Scale (Marlowe et al., 1985; Vaitkus, 1994).

I am proud to be in the U.S. Army.

I am an important part of my company.

What I do in the army is worthwhile.

Combat Readiness — Marlowe et al. (1985); Vaitkus (1994).

I think my unit would do a better job in combat than most U.S. Army units.

I think the level of training in this company is high.

I have real confidence in my unit's ability to perform its mission.

If we went to war tomorrow, I would feel good about going with my unit.

Operational Readiness - Marlowe et al. (1985); Vaitkus (1994). Item #2 is slightly modified (combat equipment was changed to "mission-essential equipment").

My company is ready for combat.

I am confident in my unit's mission-essential equipment.

I think we are better trained than most other companies in the Army.



Horizontal Cohesion and Leadership: Scale Items

Horizontal cohesion - adapted from Podsakoff and MacKenzie (1994). The wording was revised to match the military description of work group (i.e. unit).

The members of my unit are cooperative with each other.

The members of my unit know that they can depend on each other.

The members of my unit stand up for each other.

General Leadership Quality — Marlowe et al. (1985); Vaitkus (1994).

The first item is slightly altered from the original to refer to all leaders (NCOs and Officers).

The leaders in this company would lead well in combat.

I am impressed by the quality of leadership in this company.

My chain of command works well.



Vertical Cohesion: Scale Items

Vertical Cohesion (Officers) - Marlowe et al. (1985); Vaitkus (1994); see also Bliese and Halverson (1996).

The officers in my unit establish clear work objectives.

The officers in my unit avoid micromanaging soldiers' work.

The officers in my unit delegate work effectively.

The officers in my unit let soldiers know when they have done a good job.

The officers in my unit are interested in my personal welfare.

The officers in my unit are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.

Vertical Cohesion (NCOs) - Marlowe et al. (1985); Vaitkus (1994); see also Bliese and Halverson (1996).

The NCOs in my unit establish clear work objectives.

The NCOs in my unit avoid micromanaging soldiers' work.

The NCOs in my unit delegate work effectively.

The NCOs in my unit let soldiers know when they have done a good job.

The NCOs in my unit are interested in my personal welfare.

The NCOs in my unit are interested in what I think and how I feel about things.



Job Attitudes: Scale Items (1 of 3)

Recognition — Brown and Leigh (1996)

I rarely feel my work is taken for granted.

My superiors generally appreciate the way I do my job.

The organization recognizes the significance of the contributions I make.

Challenge — Brown and Leigh (1996)

My job is very challenging.

It takes all my resources to achieve my work objectives.

Effort — Brown and Leigh (1996)

Other people know me by the long hours I keep.

I work at my full capacity in all of my job duties.

I strive as hard as I can to be successful in my work.

When I work, I really exert myself to the fullest.



Job Attitudes: Scale Items (2 of 3)

Goal Acceptance — Adapted from Goal Acceptance concepts (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, & Ahearne, 1997).

The soldiers in my unit think that what's expected of us is clear.

The soldiers in my unit think that what's expected of us is reasonable.

Job Involvement/Engagement – Britt (1998).

I feel responsible for my job performance.

I am committed to my job.

How well I do in my job matters a great deal to me.

How I do in my job influences how I feel.

Job Control — adapted from the Job Diagnostic Survey General Satisfaction Scale (Hackman & Oldham, 1975).

I have personal control over my job performance.

Once I am given instructions, I am pretty much left alone to do my job.

I am allowed to do my job without constant supervision from others.



Job Attitudes: Scale Items (3 of 3)

Job Satisfaction — adapted from the Job Diagnostic Survey General Satisfaction Scale (Hackman & Oldham, 1975).

I am very satisfied with my job in the Army.

I like my job in the Army.

I am satisfied with the kind of work I do on my job.

Work Overload - adapted from the MOAQ Role Overload Scale (Cammann, Fishman, Jenkins, & Klesh, 1983). See also Bliese and Castro (in press).

I have so much work to do that I cannot do everything well.

I never seem to have enough time to get everything done.

My job leaves me with little time to get things done.

Task Significance — Bliese, Escolas, Christ, and Castro (1999).

I feel that what I am doing is important for accomplishing my unit's mission.

I am making a real contribution to accomplishing my unit's mission. What I do helps accomplish my unit's mission.



Bliese, P.D., Escolas, S.M., Christ, R.E., & Castro, C.A. (1998). Human dimensions assessment of the Task Force XXI Advance Warfighter Experiment. Alexandria, VA: Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC: ADA349889).

Bliese, P.D., & Halverson, R.R. (1996). Individual and nomothetic models of job stress: An examination of work hours, cohesion, and well-being. <u>Journal of Applied Social Psychology</u>, 26, 1171-1189.

Britt, T.W. (1998). Responsibility, morale and commitment during military operations. Military Review, 1, 77-82.

Brown, S. P., & Leigh, T. W. (1996). A new look at psychological climate and its relationship to job involvement, effort, and performance. <u>Journal of Applied Psychology</u>, 81, 358-368..

Cammann, C., Fichman, M., Jenkins, G.D. & Klesh, J. (1983). Michigan organizational assessment questionnaire. In S.E. Seashore, E. E. Lawler, P. H. Mirvis, and C. Camman (Eds.), <u>Assessing Organizational Change: A Guide to Methods, Measures, and Practices</u>. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 71-138.

Hackman, J.R., & Oldham, G.R. (1975). Development of the Job Diagnostic Survey. <u>Journal of Applied Psychology</u>, 60, 159-170.

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
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Soldier Attitudes: NCO Leadership


- NCO leadership was assessed by asking soldiers a series of questions about their NCO's management and leadership style.
- In general, evaluations of NCO leadership dropped from pre- to middeployment.
- Officers and NCOs viewed NCO leadership more favorably than did junior enlisted soldiers.





Soldier Attitudes: Officer Leadership

- Officer leadership was also assessed by asking soldiers a series of questions about officer management and leadership style.
- In general, evaluations of Officer leadership dropped from pre to mid deployment.
- Officers viewed officer leadership more favorably than both NCOs and junior enlisted soldiers.





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